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Abstract

Over the years, farmers have effectively lobbied for advantageous farm policy through organizing effective political action. An extensive literature studies the activities of farming political action committees (PACs), and the effects these activities have on farm programs. This literature treats farming PACs as exogenous entities. However, the origins of their funding support remains unexplored. This research empirically assesses possible determinants of political contributions from farmers to farming PACs, using a correlated random effects Tobit model to assess the impact of farm production characteristics and policy regimes on contributions to farming PACs and political parties.

Key words: Agricultural Policy, Lobbying, Rent Seeking, Campaign Finance

JEL classification: Q18,D72

Agricultural political action committees (PACs) are highly effective at attaining their policy goals, as evidenced by the size and scope of modern federal farm support programs. Their activities have been studied in great detail in the political economy literature. However, the question of who forms and supports these PACs is unresolved. Presumably, the main contributors to agricultural PACs are farmers. However, these organizations do not exist in a vacuum; they must be created, organized and funded by the individual people who stand to benefit from their services. What motivates farmers to contribute to the PACs that represent their interests? Understanding the political motivations of farmers provides the foundation for understanding why agricultural PACs are so effective in their activities. This research is a first step in identifying these motivations and quantifying their effect on support for farm PACs.

Studies on agricultural PAC activities and their effects on policy abound. Abler (1989) finds evidence that crop specific agricultural PACs support votes that affect policy for other crops, in order to build a majority coalition, a behavior referred to as log-rolling. Stratmann (1992b) likewise finds evidence of log-rolling among farming PACs.

PAC contribution strategies are investigated in Stratmann (1992a) and Stratmann (1996). These studies find that PACs contribute to legislators who represent a median farming constituency in an effort to affect policy outcomes, rather than legislators who are most sympathetic to their goals.

Other studies investigate the impact of campaign contributions on legislative outcomes. Stratmann (1995) and Stratmann (1998) investigate how the timing of campaign contributions affects farm bill vote decisions. Brooks, Cameron, and Carter (1998) find that sugar PACs are more powerful than soda and confectionery PACs during a failed attempt to repeal sugar tariffs. Russell (2014) finds evidence that contributions by agricultural PACs influence legislators to vote for the farm bill, while environmental PACs influence legislators to vote against the farm bill. Wright (1990) finds that lobbying affects committee voting decisions, rather than campaign contributions, though both are highly correlated with each other. Callahan (2018) finds that cotton farmers contribute significantly to legislators in the run up to an amendment vote to the 2008 farm bill that

would have curtailed cotton subsidy programs. These cotton farmers contribute largely to the same legislators as cotton PACs, and both the farmers and PACs appear to be contributing to legislators with median cotton farming constituencies, as hypothesized by Stratmann (1992a).

The great, unresolved question in the campaign finance literature is why PACs spend so little on direct campaign contributions. Ansolabehere et al. (2003) find that the bulk of campaign financing comes from individuals, rather than PACs. Further, despite the fact that PACs face low donation limits, these limits never bind. In the case of agricultural PACs, the benefits received from farm bill programs amount to billions of dollars per year. There are two possible reasons for this observation. First, if PACs treat contributions as an investment, then contribution levels should equal the expected benefit of contributing, assuming contribution limits don't bind. If this is the case, then the reason for low contribution levels is due to a small probability that the contributions will affect policy outcomes. Second, it could be the case that farm PACs spend money on forms of influence other than direct campaign contributions. This is potentially beneficial to PACs because other forms of influence, such as lobbying activities, are difficult to trace, due to data limitations. In this case, such as lobbying activities, are difficult to study due to data limitations. If this is the case, then studying the fund raising activities of PACs is of benefit, since inflows will be a stronger predictor of influence than direct campaign contributions, the only example of the many forms of outflows that are easily tracked.

This research also draws on the emerging literature on political contributions by individual people. Ensley (2009) finds that individuals are motivated more by the absolute policy positions of candidates rather than the relative differences between candidate policy positions. Fremeth, Richter, and Schaufele (2013) study campaign contributions by corporate CEOs over the course of their careers. They find that when individuals become CEOs, they contribute more to legislators who regulate their firm's industry, and that they reduce contributions upon retirement. Gimpel, Lee, and Kaminski (2006) find geographic patterns in individual campaign contributions that are independent of demographic characteristics, and suggest the use of social networks to apply polit-

ical pressure. Gimpel, Lee, and Pearson-Merkowitz (2008) go further, finding that wealthy donors contribute predominantly to close congressional races in non-local congressional districts. This suggests partisan motivations rather than access-oriented motivations for political giving. Ovtchinnikov and Pantaleoni (2012) is the closest in spirit to this research, finding that individuals contribute to politicians with the power to affect their economic well being. In districts that have high a degree of concentration in a given industry, individuals more heavily contribute to legislators with power over said industry.

This research addresses three fundamental questions about farmer political behavior. Do farmers significantly support agricultural PACs? Do production conditions affect farmer contributions? Do farm bill regimes, and farm bill votes and election timing affect contribution behavior? Answering these questions using a reduced form analysis is the first step towards understanding the political motivations behind farmer political contribution behavior.

Section 2 discusses the theories of the incentives that farmers face when making political donations. Section 3 describes the data and the strategy used to identify political contributors made by farmers. Section 4 discusses the empirical model. Section 5 explores the results, and section 6 concludes.

Theory

Farmers face a collective action problem. The more dispersed farmers are geographically, the harder it is to organize, and the stronger the incentives for free riding. In line with Gardner (1987), farmers of more geographically concentrated crops are expected to contribute more per capita than farmers of crops that are grown over a wider area. This should manifest in higher per capita contributions to farming PACs and larger benefits from subsidy programs. For this reason, this research will focus on four crops; corn, cotton, rice and peanuts. Corn and cotton are crops that are geographically dispersed, while peanut and rice farming is highly concentrated geographically.

There are two competing theories regarding the effect of production conditions on farmer

political behavior. The first is that farmers contribute more when profits are high, since they have more resources to spare on political giving. If this is the case, we expect better production conditions to have a positive impact on contributions.

The alternative theory is that farmers contribute more when profits are low, in an attempt to secure relief from Congress, such as disaster subsidies, which Garrett, Marsh, and Marshall (2006) show the Congress is more than happy to provide. If this is the case, better production conditions should have a negative impact on contributions by farmers to political organizations.

Data

Data on individual political contributions comes from Center for Responsive Politics (2017). These data contain records of all individual political contributions in excess of $200. The Center for Responsive Politics assigns industry and political issue codes to each PAC, allowing for easy identification of PAC types. Individual contributor identifying information consists of their full name and the zip code of their mailing address.

Identification of which individual political contributors are farmers is accomplished using individual subsidy transaction records USDA Farm Services Agency (2016), obtained via freedom of information act request. These data contain a complete record of farm subsidy transactions since 1995, including information on the program disbursing the subsidy and what crop the subsidy is for. Since these data contain the names and mailing addresses of every subsidy receiving farmer in the US, the list of farmers is cross referenced with the list of political donors from the Open Secrets database. These data are matched using the last name, first initial and postal zip code of the farmer. In addition to being used to calculate farmer political contributions, these data are used to calculate how much farmers receive in farm subsidies, as well as the number of subsidy receiving farmers located within a given county for each crop.

Farm production data comes from the USDA National Agricultural Statistics Service. County

level yields and total production are obtained at the county level. Price is obtained at the state level. Revenue is calculated by multiplying state level prices by county level production. Unfortunately, no data exists on profit, the most relevant production characteristics.

Summary statistics for model variables are presented in table 1. This analysis focuses on farmers of four crops; corn, cotton peanuts and rice. These crops are chosen because farmers of these crops contribute significantly to both farming and political party PACs, and because these crops vary in geographic concentration, with corn farming being highly spread out, peanut and rice farming being highly concentrated, and cotton farming concentration falling between these two extremes. Overall, farmers of each crop contribute more to the Republican Party than the Democratic Party. Corn farmers contribute more to the Republican Party than they do to agricultural PACs. Cotton farmers contribute more to Republican Party than to cotton PACs.

Tables 2 through 6 report campaign contributions divided by quintile of subsidy receipt, for the time period from 2002 to 2016. For farmers of the given crops and for farmers in general, farmers in the top subsidy receipt quintile donate substantially more to crop specific and agricultural PACs than farmers who receive fewer subsidies. For each crop considered here, farmers contribute several times as much money to the Republican Party as they do to the Democratic Party.

While subsidies appear to have little effect on contributions made by corn and cotton farmers to political parties, peanut and rice farmers in the top quintile of subsidy receipts make substantially more in contributions to political parties than farmers who receive fewer subsidies.

Figure 1 shows contribution levels for corn farmers. Corn farmers contribute heavily to the Republican Party, more so than any other form of PAC up until 2013, when Republican Party contributions fall dramatically. The Democratic Party also receives substantial contributions from corn farmers. Both parties receive more during election years. Corn PAC and agricultural PAC contributions increase steadily over the time series until 2013, when they start falling.

Cotton farmer contributions are reported in figure 2. Like corn farmers, cotton farmers also contribute heavily to the Republican Party until 2013. Cotton and agricultural PACs also see a drop

in contributions from cotton farmers in 2014. However, cotton and agricultural PAC contributions increase again in 2016.

Peanut farmer contributions are shown in figure 3. Republican Party contributions from peanut farmers start out high and drop off by 2004. While Republican Party contributions are higher than Democratic Party contributions, both are quite low. Peanut and agricultural PAC contributions spike after 2008, and remain high until 2014 when all contributions decline sharply, increasing after that point.

Figure 4 shows contribution levels from rice farmers. Like peanut farmer contributions, rice farmer contributions start off high and fall sharply after 2002. They remain low through the rest of the time series, though there is a spike in 2004 and 2012. Republican Party contributions are higher than Democratic Party contributions except in 2014. Rice and agricultural PAC contributions are almost identical in all years, indicating that rice farmers contribute almost exclusively to rice PACs. Contributions to rice and agricultural PACs increase steadily throughout the time series.

Empirical Model

Due to the large number of zero observations in these data, a Tobit model is called for. Given the fact these data are constructed as a panel, the correlated random effects Tobit model, as described by Wooldridge (2010), is utilized. This specification allows the regressors to be correlated with the unobserved random effect. This is critically important, since farm production variables are certainly correlated with time invariant unobservables such as intrinsic land productivity.

This research considers four kinds of political contributions made by farmers of four crops. The contribution categories are crop specific PACs, agricultural PACs as a whole, the Republican Party and the Democratic Party. Each category of contributions is measured in three ways; levels, per donor and per capita. Studying levels of contributions explains where contributions go and how measures of production and federal support affect these levels. The study of contributions per donor allows for the analysis of what factors motivate the decision to contribute, in particular

how the number of farmers affects how much each farmer donates. The study of contributions per capita estimates how the number of farmers affects the average contribution. Both the per donor and per capita models assess the degree to which geographic concentration affects contribution behavior.

The independent variables are county level revenue, county level average yields, county level crop specific commodity subsidies, state level prices and the number of farmers of that crop within the county. Note that in the per donor and per capita models, revenue and subsidy receipts are in per capita terms rather than levels. Temporal indicators denoting farm bill regime, farm bill votes and election years are also included. Spatial heterogeneity is controlled for by including indicators for ARMS III production regions. To facilitate estimation of standard errors, contributions and the number of farmers are rescaled in terms of thousands, while revenue and subsidy receipts are rescaled in terms of millions. Revenue in the corn model is rescaled in terms of hundreds of millions.

These variables are measured annually. Since farm subsidies and farm production variables are known roughly in the last quarter of a calendar year, they are lagged by one year in the model. The time series extends from 2002 to 2016. The estimations are conducted using the QLIM Procedure in SAS Software, SAS Institute Inc. (2014)

Results

Estimation results are shown in tables 7 through 10, with marginal effects reported in tables 11 through 14. The most important factors explaining political contributions by corn farmers are yields and prices. In all estimations, higher yields and prices significantly increase contributions. When taken with the evidence from the descriptive statistics of contributions by subsidy quintiles, it is clear that farmers with larger farms (which receive more in subsidies) contribute substantially more to agricultural PACs, while not necessarily contributing more or less to political parties. As

such, it is likely that there is little relationship between corn farm productivity and contributions to political parties. While revenue lacks statistical significance, in unreported estimations that all production characteristics except revenue, higher revenue corresponds to an increase in contributions to all of the considered forms of PACs.

A higher number of corn farms leads to a reduction in corn PAC contributions per donor and per capita, and a reduction in contributions per capita to agricultural PACs. On the other hand, a larger number of corn farmers increases contributions to both political parties, suggesting that counties with a larger number of corn farmers not only contribute more, but contribute more on average than counties with fewer corn farmers. This means that, the higher the concentration of corn farmers, the more each farmer contributes to political parties. While subsidy receipts don't affect corn farmer contributions to political parties, the fact that the number of corn farmers affects the average contribution both per donor and per capita indicates that higher densities lead to more cooperation in political giving to parties.

There are also clear temporal trends in contributions. While corn PACs don't receive significantly more in election years, general agricultural PACs and political parties do. Relative to the 2002 farm bill regime, corn farmers contribute more to agricultural PACs and less to political parties in later farm bill regimes. Interestingly, corn farmers contributed less during the 2002 and 2014 farm bill votes. While corn farmers contributed less to corn PACs, agricultural PACs and the Democratic Party during the 2008 farm bill vote, they contributed more the Republican Party, which was not in power at the time. In all estimates, the likelihood ratio test of the joint significance of the averages are highly statistically significant, demonstrating the importance of including these terms to control for correlation between the regressors and unobservables.

The effect of production measures on cotton farmer contributions follow a similar pattern to corn farmer contributions. Higher cotton yields increase contributions of all types. Higher prices increase contributions in all cases, though the effect lacks statistical significance for contributions to cotton PACs. Higher revenues correspond to higher contributions to cotton PACs in terms of

levels, higher contributions in levels and per capita terms to the Republican Party, and higher contributions per donor and per capita to the Democratic Party. Cotton farmer subsidy receipts have little effect in most specifications, though they do increase contributions to agricultural PACs per capita, and Democratic Party contributions per donor and per capita. In unreported estimations where all production characteristics except revenue are omitted, higher revenues have an ambiguous effect on contributions. The only clear trend is that higher revenue leads to higher contributions to agricultural PACs.

Interestingly, the number of cotton farmers in a county does not have a statistically significant effect on the level of contributions going to cotton PACs, though it does increase cotton PAC contributions per donor and per capita. An increase in cotton farmers does increase agricultural PAC contributions overall and in per donor terms, and increases Republican Party donations overall, per donor and per capita. A higher number of cotton farmers increases the level of Democratic Party contributions, along with contributions per donor, though not contributions per capita.

Temporal trends are less clear than in the case of corn farmer contributions. Cotton farmers contributed more to agricultural PACs during the 2008 farm bill regime than in the prior regime. Cotton farmers contributed less to the Republican Party in the 2008 and 2014 farm bill regimes than in the 2002 farm bill regime, while contributing less to the Democratic Party in the 2014 farm bill regime. Cotton farmers contributed significantly less to cotton and agricultural PACs during the 2002 and 2014 farm bill votes, and agricultural PACs received less during the 2008 farm bill vote. The Republican Party received more in contributions during the 2008 farm bill vote, and less during the 2014 farm bill vote in level and per capita terms. The Republican and Democratic Parties receive significantly more in contributions from cotton farmers during election years. The likelihood ratio tests for the joint significance of the averages of regressors are statistically significant in all estimations except for Republican Party contributions per capita.

Production measures have less clear effects on contributions by peanut farmers. High yields lead to higher contributions per donor and per capita to peanut PACs, while an increase in revenue only

increases the level of contributions to peanut PACs. An increase in yields increases agricultural PAC contributions, while an increase in revenue has no effect. Higher prices lead to more contributions to peanut PACs, agricultural PACs and the Republican Party. An increase in subsidies decreases contributions to peanut PACs and agricultural PACs in terms of levels. In unreported estimations omitting production factors other than revenue, higher revenue leads to higher contributions to peanut and agricultural PACs, but have no effect on political party contributions. An increase in the number of peanut farmers leads to an increase in total peanut and agricultural PAC contributions, while having no effect on these contributions in per donor or per capita terms, while an increase in the number of peanut farmers increases Republican Party contributions in levels, per donor and per capita terms. No variables related to production affect contributions to the Democratic Party.

Peanut farmers contributed more to peanut PACs and agricultural PACs during the 2008 and 2014 farm bill regimes, relative to the 2002 farm bill regime. With that said, they contributed less to the Republican Party during the 2014 farm bill regime relative to previous policy regimes. Peanut and agricultural PACs also receive less from peanut farmers in years when farm bills are voted upon. Election years do not affect contributions to agricultural PACs, while they do result in increased contributions to the Republican Party. The likelihood ratio test for the joint significance of the averages of the regressors is statistically significant in all but the estimation modeling peanut PAC contributions per donor.

An increase in rice yields, rice revenue or rice prices increase contributions from rice farmers to rice PACs. The effect is not statistically significant for revenue in the per donor model and yields in the per capita model. An increase in rice subsidies reduces the level of contributions to rice PACs, while they increase rice PAC contributions per donor. An increase in the number of rice farmers reduces rice contributions per capita. This suggests a collective action problem. The trends in contributions to rice PACs also match the trends in agricultural PACs at large, which is consistent with the fact that the vast majority of agricultural PAC contributions made by rice farmers go to

rice PACs. A higher level of rice yields results in higher contributions to the Republican Party, and a higher level of rice subsidy receipts corresponds to an increase in contributions to the Republican Party in terms of levels. An increase in rice subsidies increases Democratic Party contributions in terms of levels, per donor and per capita terms. In unreported estimations including only rice farmer revenue, a larger number of rice farmers leads to significantly more contributions to rice and agricultural PACs, while having little effect on political party contributions.

Rice farmers contributed significantly less to rice and agricultural PACs during the 2008 farm bill regime relative to the 2002 and 2014 farm bill regimes. Rice farmers contributed significantly more to the Republican Party during the 2014 farm bill regime, and contribute significantly more to the Republican Party during election years. The likelihood ratio test for the joint significance of the averages of regressors lacks statistical significance in the estimations of the level of Republican and Democratic Party contributions.

Conclusion

Farmers contribute substantial sums to political action committees. Results strongly suggest that farmers of corn, peanuts and rice contribute more to both agricultural PACs and political parties when revenues are high, though the effect is ambiguous for cotton farmers. This suggests that farmers contribute when profits are high, suggesting that farmers contribute when they have more resources to spare.

The more these farmers receive in farm subsidies, the more likely they are to contribute to agricultural PACs, and in some cases, political parties. Due to the fact larger farming operations receive more in subsidies, the subsidy receipt quintiles are better thought of as proxies for farm size than measuring the effect of subsidies directly on contribution amounts. The farmers in the top quintile make by far the largest number of contributions to agricultural PACs. While this should not be surprising, it does affirm that the largest farms, with the most federal support, contribute the most to agricultural PACs. More interestingly, while there appears to be little relationship between

farm size and political party contributions from corn and cotton farmers, there does appear to be a relationship for peanut and rice farmers. This provides circumstantial evidence for the assertion that farmers of geographically concentrated crops are better able to organize political action due to lower transactions costs, as argued in Gardner (1987).

Timing also affects contribution behavior by farmers. Corn farmers contribute more to all categories of PACs considered here during election years. Cotton, peanut and rice farmers contribute more to the Republican Party during election years. This suggests increased political giving during the peak of election cycles. However, in years in which farm bills are voted upon, farmers of each crop considered here contribute less to crop specific and agricultural PACs. This indicates a preference for political party rather than agricultural PAC giving, since each considered farm bill is voted upon during an election year. The effect of farm bill regimes on contribution patterns varies by crop, as one should expect.

Further research is required to understand the precise relationship between agricultural PACs and farmers. Do agricultural PACs inform farmers who to lobby, vote for or contribute money to? Do PACs simply lobby farmers for monetary support to conduct these activities on their behalf? These questions require a more finely tuned analysis. Such research should also construct a behavior model explaining this relationship between farmers and PACs. Ideally, such research will incorporate contributions from farmers to candidates, from farmers to PACs, and from PACs to candidates in a comprehensive framework.

The fact that farmers contribute heavily to the Republican Party, and in the case of contribute more to the Republican Party than to agricultural PACs, is a shocking and entirely unexpected empirical finding. Further research should focus on whether or not these contributions are made as a form of investment, and if so, how the relationship between farmers and the Republican Party works.

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Appendix

Table 1. Summary statistics for model variables. All dollar amounts are inflation adjusted to 2017 dollars.

Variable	Crop	N	Min	Max	Mean	STD
Corn PAC Donation	Corn	24,150	0.00	14,673.70	51.32	387.15
Ag. PAC Donation	Corn	24,150	0.00	15,761.22	126.48	553.10
RNC Donation	Corn	24,150	0.00	55,291.30	279.20	1,579.95
DNC Donation	Corn	24,150	0.00	47,985.15	110.46	1,174.57
Corn Yield	Corn	24,150	0.00	238.80	122.83	49.23
Corn Revenue	Corn	24,150	0.00	399,156,567.14	29,641,834.29	43,315,792.85
Corn Price	Corn	24,150	0.00	8.26	3.97	1.77
Corn Subsidy	Corn	24,150	-358,248.73	60,209,956.09	2,419,676.98	4,254,335.50
Number of Corn Farmers	Corn	24,150	0.00	2,865.00	182.71	231.21
Cotton PAC Donation	Cotton	4,515	0.00	29,104.68	337.24	1,197.49
Ag. PAC Donation	Cotton	4,515	0.00	115,699.46	521.52	2,442.49
RNC Donation	Cotton	4,515	0.00	38,400.66	398.70	2,154.97
DNC Donation	Cotton	4,515	0.00	23,621.90	91.04	688.55
Cotton Yield	Cotton	4,515	0.00	1,959.00	754.26	331.55
Cotton Revenue	Cotton	4,515	0.00	501,531.28	33,069.63	44,452.29
Cotton Price	Cotton	4,515	0.00	1.16	0.63	0.23
Cotton Subsidy	Cotton	4,515	0.00	74,376,394.46	4,782,000.09	6,467,173.05
Number of Cotton Farmers	Cotton	4,515	0.00	1,875.00	172.63	229.66
Peanut PAC Donation	Peanut	1,305	0.00	30,131.76	244.35	1,281.09
Ag. PAC Donation	Peanut	1,305	0.00	32,458.31	422.35	1,676.74
RNC Donation	Peanut	1,305	0.00	70,778.52	182.75	2,041.41
DNC Donation	Peanut	1,305	0.00	5,223.41	23.31	242.15
Peanut Yield	Peanut	1,305	0.00	6,177.00	2,962.71	1,306.07
Peanut Revenue	Peanut	1,305	0.00	77,439,539.24	8,852,458.42	9,167,003.09
Peanut Price	Peanut	1,305	0.00	0.46	0.22	0.09
Peanut Subsidy	Peanut	1,305	-28,345.22	45,313,329.03	2,439,658.04	4,758,561.29
Number of Peanut Farmers	Peanut	1,305	0.00	1,438.00	79.43	164.44
Rice PAC Donation	Rice	1,035	0.00	27,825.41	1,583.93	3,454.07
Ag. PAC Donation	Rice	1,035	0.00	27,825.41	1,677.87	3,503.65
RNC Donation	Rice	1,035	0.00	413,960.01	965.18	13,143.89
DNC Donation	Rice	1,035	0.00	18,491.46	147.60	975.67
Rice Yield	Rice	1,035	0.00	10,350.00	6,286.32	2,055.63
Rice Revenue	Rice	1,035	0.00	400,420,772.09	34,812,593.69	43,325,573.07
Rice Price	Rice	1,035	0.00	30.66	11.43	5.37
Rice Subsidy	Rice	1,035	-594,163.81	104,042,982.01	9,704,747.36	11,209,474.92
Number of Rice Farmers	Rice	1,035	0.00	3,735.00	262.55	474.86

Table 2. Contributions from farmers of all crops to specific types of PACs divided by subsidy receipt quintiles.

Quintile	Recipient	N	Min	Max	Mean	STD	Sum
1	Farm PACs	6,919	7.04	7,807.64	623.83	693.44	4,316,278.18
2	Farm PACs	862	20.42	5,338.16	681.39	718.83	587,354.44
3	Farm PACs	452	20.22	5,833.70	569.32	626.84	257,334.58
4	Farm PACs	303	9.24	5,191.35	733.05	815.26	222,115.45
5	Farm PACs	244	8.04	5,105.66	575.69	627.44	140,467.30
1	Ag. PACs	9,794	5.03	18,133.19	608.19	758.90	5,956,621.18
2	Ag. PACs	2,063	5.03	9,886.27	569.19	687.37	1,174,238.83
3	Ag. PACs	1,159	1.35	32,016.88	538.87	1,113.90	624,551.23
4	Ag. PACs	901	5.03	5,191.35	515.26	610.71	464,253.58
5	Ag. PACs	661	5.03	8,258.61	477.97	776.50	315,935.76
1	RNC	6,375	1.01	354,616.87	986.40	8,192.17	6,288,312.00
2	RNC	5,949	1.01	34,996.46	680.94	1,731.54	4,050,924.30
3	RNC	6,207	1.01	214,989.94	885.25	4,355.67	5,494,742.00
4	RNC	6,289	1.01	152,071.38	769.83	2,785.58	4,841,451.31
5	RNC	5,684	1.01	35,276.54	750.16	1,984.95	4,263,916.62
1	DNC	1,342	3.06	175,327.10	1,125.82	7,134.40	1,510,853.32
2	DNC	1,583	3.02	34,624.17	735.54	2,175.35	1,164,358.87
3	DNC	2,344	1.01	143,079.79	761.69	3,600.33	1,785,407.06
4	DNC	2,144	5.05	35,657.54	892.38	2,642.70	1,913,264.74
5	DNC	2,301	3.02	34,602.52	751.19	2,208.53	1,728,479.52

Table 3. Contributions from corn farmers to specific types of PACs divided by subsidy receipt quintiles.

Quintile	Recipient	N	Min	Max	Mean	STD	Sum
1	Corn PACs	1,234	25.19	5,596.04	776.62	924.92	958,344.23
2	Corn PACs	234	20.42	5,338.16	680.57	812.48	159,254.37
3	Corn PACs	81	20.68	4,339.90	757.86	836.93	61,386.63
4	Corn PACs	37	127.03	3,580.46	650.98	734.28	24,086.29
5	Corn PACs	19	214.00	2,299.43	601.13	540.99	11,421.50
1	Ag. PACs	6,125	5.03	18,133.19	615.93	795.82	3,772,553.77
2	Ag. PACs	1,492	5.03	8,040.16	533.53	634.31	796,021.69
3	Ag. PACs	711	1.35	8,280.56	485.75	654.33	345,371.68
4	Ag. PACs	547	5.03	4,647.81	548.67	691.55	300,121.04
5	Ag. PACs	368	5.03	7,415.76	409.23	668.52	150,595.83
1	RNC	4,392	1.01	143,326.62	687.58	2,941.63	3,019,843.90
2	RNC	3,878	1.01	34,974.85	690.82	1,758.34	2,679,015.29
3	RNC	3,837	1.01	79,835.04	834.49	3,164.76	3,201,941.88
4	RNC	3,627	1.01	33,109.06	645.53	1,458.51	2,341,345.77
5	RNC	2,990	1.01	35,276.54	757.52	2,023.65	2,264,977.21
1	DNC	882	3.06	35,287.05	889.29	2,693.55	784,355.61
2	DNC	1,070	3.02	34,624.17	821.88	2,509.08	879,411.00
3	DNC	1,458	1.01	143,079.79	797.91	4,306.10	1,163,347.89
4	DNC	1,207	5.11	35,657.54	982.47	3,037.38	1,185,841.71
5	DNC	1,220	3.02	34,602.52	836.29	2,777.97	1,020,270.45

Table 4. Contributions from cotton farmers to specific types of PACs divided by subsidy receipt quintiles.

Quintile	Recipient	N	Min	Max	Mean	STD	Sum
1	Cotton PACs	1,674	88.29	4,516.15	539.90	417.19	903,787.18
2	Cotton PACs	134	158.91	2,590.16	615.24	415.00	82,442.30
3	Cotton PACs	61	261.79	1,616.72	607.69	360.27	37,069.38
4	Cotton PACs	60	223.49	5,191.35	754.99	689.37	45,299.49
5	Cotton PACs	32	234.59	1,800.32	687.40	397.00	21,996.86
1	Ag. PACs	3,719	20.13	18,133.19	611.04	867.13	2,272,448.72
2	Ag. PACs	385	87.12	9,886.27	685.55	886.57	263,935.94
3	Ag. PACs	152	2.68	32,016.88	776.26	2,608.96	117,991.81
4	Ag. PACs	113	9.24	5,191.35	671.57	608.06	75,887.14
5	Ag. PACs	81	103.83	6,851.31	757.17	1,030.56	61,331.15
1	RNC	1,446	51.57	32,951.48	750.06	1,898.49	1,084,580.28
2	RNC	865	52.18	34,996.46	820.21	2,337.01	709,480.59
3	RNC	752	31.15	33,663.56	847.86	2,293.20	637,587.61
4	RNC	680	20.94	33,250.40	983.80	3,159.36	668,984.88
5	RNC	498	31.42	34,885.28	957.17	2,932.88	476,672.31
1	DNC	217	11.40	14,474.16	1,509.42	2,309.02	327,543.61
2	DNC	179	3.15	11,418.85	808.37	1,505.99	144,699.08
3	DNC	216	21.94	33,592.73	1,128.72	2,645.17	243,804.01
4	DNC	204	10.47	34,852.55	1,173.14	3,597.27	239,320.31
5	DNC	180	26.95	10,508.33	746.62	1,241.17	134,390.76

Table 5. Contributions from peanut farmers to specific types of PACs divided by subsidy receipt quintiles.

Quintile	Recipient	N	Min	Max	Mean	STD	Sum
1	Peanut PACs	773	7.04	6,866.25	623.33	693.87	481,835.32
2	Peanut PACs	46	51.03	2,170.74	586.17	544.97	26,963.65
3	Peanut PACs	26	72.42	1,046.80	301.91	204.38	7,849.68
4	Peanut PACs	9	236.70	973.54	452.20	308.50	4,069.79
5	Peanut PACs	6	270.01	1,832.77	728.77	672.20	4,372.65
1	Ag. PACs	1486	7.04	6,866.25	625.71	668.16	929,804.55
2	Ag. PACs	90	51.03	3,676.96	597.68	535.02	53,791.03
3	Ag. PACs	41	72.42	1,046.80	387.83	224.62	15,901.00
4	Ag. PACs	21	236.70	1,335.00	613.13	369.46	12,875.82
5	Ag. PACs	8	262.92	1,832.77	637.29	595.23	5,098.33
1	RNC	261	1.01	6,477.26	475.01	687.28	123,977.37
2	RNC	95	25.13	12,290.19	552.81	1,245.90	52,516.48
3	RNC	61	1.01	2,180.72	354.89	330.43	21,648.33
4	RNC	26	55.30	6,732.71	648.22	1,267.34	16,853.82
5	RNC	23	102.05	1,099.21	389.25	227.44	8,952.81
1	DNC	48	50.37	5,350.05	812.44	1,561.56	38,996.90
2	DNC	29	25.13	1,126.85	295.32	279.14	8,564.23
3	DNC	23	10.47	2,868.86	398.35	577.94	9,161.99
4	DNC	6	249.62	3,218.56	1,251.28	1,072.07	7,507.67
5	DNC	18	10.21	1,087.52	194.15	274.35	3,494.71

Table 6. Contributions from rice farmers to specific types of PACs divided by subsidy receipt quintiles.

Quintile	Recipient	N	Min	Max	Mean	STD	Sum
1	Rice PACs	1624	102.66	5,733.80	500.71	454.15	813,159.74
2	Rice PACs	96	154.70	2,865.04	544.96	428.82	52,315.76
3	Rice PACs	62	255.67	2,515.22	551.99	422.62	34,223.14
4	Rice PACs	37	116.77	1,276.70	392.33	226.78	14,516.29
5	Rice PACs	40	229.42	3,772.46	551.71	576.57	22,068.22
1	Ag. PACs	1992	102.66	18,133.19	535.19	916.68	1,066,099.45
2	Ag. PACs	162	103.41	3,786.77	592.79	537.95	96,032.53
3	Ag. PACs	75	255.67	2,515.22	592.99	437.56	44,474.07
4	Ag. PACs	49	104.80	1,276.70	410.50	267.50	20,114.46
5	Ag. PACs	45	229.35	3,772.46	558.87	565.36	25,149.37
1	RNC	638	10.21	354,616.87	3,437.79	24,336.09	2,193,312.80
2	RNC	251	1.01	4,065.99	540.25	610.41	135,601.92
3	RNC	217	26.23	33,109.06	694.06	2,290.05	150,611.32
4	RNC	98	51.27	11,464.65	745.03	1,315.93	73,012.83
5	RNC	89	88.25	10,992.06	685.02	1,381.77	60,967.12
1	DNC	108	217.95	175,327.10	6,281.24	24,261.36	678,373.94
2	DNC	83	3.15	3,503.12	654.56	692.12	54,328.64
3	DNC	46	101.08	2,401.17	626.96	462.48	28,840.25
4	DNC	42	15.11	2,811.56	475.77	610.13	19,982.26
5	DNC	78	15.08	6,689.35	561.75	889.15	43,816.33

Table 7. Estimation results for campaign contributions by corn farmers to various forms of PACs. For crop specific, general agricultural PAC, RNC and DNC contributions, the first estimation is conducted in terms of levels, the second is in terms of contributions per donor and the third is in terms of contributions per capita. The subsidy receipt and acres harvested variables are in per capita terms in the per donor and per capita models. *,,*** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.**

Variable	Corn PAC	Corn Per Donor	Corn Per Capita	Ag. PAC	Ag. PAC Per Donor	Ag. PAC Per Capita	RNC	RNC Per Donor	RNC Per Capita	DNC	DNC Per Donor	DNC Per Capita
Constant	-13.037	-2.790	-659.946	-8.434	-4.699	-938.227	-6.877	-3.556	-256.498	-6.790	-4.082	-107.250
	(2.498)***	(1.254)**	(253.796)***	(1.247)***	(0.736)***	(132.737)***	(1.662)***	(0.923)***	(57.715)***	(2.906)**	(2.066)**	(49.444)**
Corn Yield	6.309	2.952	475.195	5.204	3.703	580.674	11.573	6.656	310.555	10.703	8.194	190.011
	(1.938)***	(0.823)***	(142.323)***	(0.749)***	(0.428)***	(91.436)***	(1.469)***	(0.833)***	(55.695)***	(2.691)***	(1.884)***	(47.318)***
Corn Revenue	-0.006	0.316	12.258	0.337	0.156	23.021	-0.153	-0.596	2.125	0.546	0.557	-1.746
	(0.206)	(0.307)	(51.487)	(0.102)***	(0.205)	(44.886)	(0.217)	(0.637)	(37.522)	(0.349)	(0.967)	(26.728)
Corn Price	0.377	0.153	28.088	0.169	0.098	22.362	0.301	0.171	14.837	0.291	0.235	6.721
	(0.052)***	(0.021)***	(3.593)***	(0.019)***	(0.011)***	(2.307)***	(0.040)***	(0.022)***	(1.479)***	(0.071)***	(0.048)***	(1.197)***
Corn Subsidy	0.011	0.146	36.235	-0.004	0.095	66.783	-0.085	-0.192	66.723	-0.112	0.589	59.243
	(0.012)	(0.231)	(36.477)	(0.007)	(0.154)	(31.921)*	(0.014)***	(0.566)	(25.243)***	(0.023)***	(0.668)	(15.670)***
Num. Farmers	-0.396	-0.306	-97.674	0.143	-0.007	-59.523	2.296	1.034	59.984	3.987	2.280	35.199
	(0.243)	(0.117)***	(20.262)***	(0.151)	(0.087)	(18.840)***	(0.376)***	(0.215)***	(14.617)***	(0.601)***	(0.420)***	(10.766)***
Average Corn Yield	5.514	9.851	1239.146	-1.030	0.949	317.930	-6.018	-5.791	-305.501	-6.999	-10.155	-198.753
	(4.919)	(2.211)***	(410.274)***	(2.590)	(1.356)	(246.804)	(3.539)*	(1.825)***	(114.478)***	(6.325)	(4.112)**	(99.034)**
Avg. Corn Revenue	0.035	0.009	13.326	0.027	0.060	14.988	0.004	0.085	9.438	0.032	0.143	3.976
	(0.013)***	(0.024)	(6.837)*	(0.005)***	(0.015)***	(3.508)***	(0.008)	(0.026)***	(1.629)***	(0.013)**	(0.057)**	(1.361)***
Avg. Corn Price	0.768	-0.672	-52.515	0.893	0.364	69.571	0.044	0.004	0.402	-1.353	-1.085	-27.573
	(0.601)	(0.296)**	(57.973)	(0.277)***	(0.162)**	(29.683)**	(0.372)	(0.206)	(12.958)	(0.651)**	(0.461)**	(11.028)**
Avg. Corn Subsidy	-0.126	3.901	292.220	-0.184	1.505	317.896	-0.046	-1.577	-44.244	-0.495	-2.517	-85.668
	(0.155)	(1.561)**	(311.678)	(0.071)***	(0.928)	(203.012)	(0.107)	(1.627)	(100.141)	(0.184)***	(3.461)	(82.206)
Avg. Num. Farmers	1.314	2.292	405.220	0.783	1.863	341.146	4.787	2.083	101.883	4.773	3.142	80.401
	(0.634)**	(0.226)***	(42.993)***	(0.446)*	(0.256)***	(40.607)***	(0.789)***	(0.354)***	(23.063)***	(1.292)***	(0.718)***	(17.695)***
2008 Regime	0.986	0.398	58.972	0.484	0.281	45.941	-1.594	-0.772	-43.279	-0.399	-0.028	-1.906
	(0.172)***	(0.076)***	(13.248)***	(0.069)***	(0.038)***	(8.286)***	(0.131)***	(0.074)***	(4.963)***	(0.232)*	(0.162)	(4.092)
2014 Regime	0.862	0.342	64.620	-0.245	-0.152	-25.811	-4.878	-2.522	-154.502	-3.912	-2.423	-55.247
	(0.169)***	(0.074)***	(12.819)***	(0.075)***	(0.042)***	(9.132)***	(0.183)***	(0.104)***	(7.025)***	(0.312)***	(0.219)***	(5.483)***
2002 Vote	-1.148	-0.542	-70.252	-0.712	-0.411	-66.582	-0.690	-0.358	-18.227	-1.853	-1.194	-30.645
	(0.312)***	(0.151)***	(26.586)***	(0.109)***	(0.063)***	(13.578)***	(0.141)***	(0.083)***	(5.581)***	(0.303)***	(0.216)***	(5.540)***
2008 Vote	-0.552	-0.252	-57.100	-0.590	-0.279	-68.081	0.909	0.512	26.387	-0.013	0.107	0.956
	(0.172)***	(0.085)***	(14.780)***	(0.085)***	(0.050)***	(10.738)***	(0.144)***	(0.084)***	(5.630)***	(0.260)	(0.186)	(4.695)
2014 Vote	-0.378	-0.085	-44.370	-0.346	-0.183	-45.560	-3.686	-2.155	-136.418	-2.563	-1.883	-34.761
	(0.212)*	(0.102)	(17.812)**	(0.115)***	(0.067)***	(14.750)***	(0.511)***	(0.289)***	(18.677)***	(0.672)***	(0.475)***	(10.678)***
Election Year	0.151	0.029	15.669	0.159	0.063	19.301	1.759	0.860	57.521	1.989	1.225	31.771
	(0.092)	(0.044)	(7.604)**	(0.043)***	(0.025)**	(5.356)***	(0.084)***	(0.048)***	(3.229)***	(0.152)***	(0.107)***	(2.725)***
Plains	-1.756	-0.701	-90.818	-0.043	0.185	28.670	0.586	0.229	18.524	1.514	1.022	27.616
	(0.362)***	(0.142)***	(31.703)***	(0.170)	(0.132)	(19.487)	(0.263)**	(0.142)	(8.850)**	(0.467)***	(0.320)***	(7.623)***
Midwest	-0.719	-0.165	-28.002	-0.220	0.043	5.706	-0.105	-0.082	-4.214	0.225	0.288	7.036
	(0.300)**	(0.109)	(22.958)	(0.168)	(0.134)	(18.267)	(0.241)	(0.130)	(8.176)	(0.429)	(0.295)	(7.051)
South	-3.824	-1.438	-240.829	0.174	0.245	38.300	0.384	0.142	15.240	-0.329	-0.023	1.035
	(0.627)***	(0.258)***	(52.265)***	(0.216)	(0.140)*	(22.268)*	(0.292)	(0.157)	(9.862)	(0.553)	(0.379)	(9.035)
Atlantic	-2.999	-1.017	-171.857	-0.948	-0.393	-63.927	-0.405	-0.166	-13.678	0.490	0.574	13.456
	(0.438)***	(0.259)***	(33.076)***	(0.201)***	(0.135)***	(20.532)***	(0.260)	(0.141)	(8.858)	(0.464)	(0.320)*	(7.667)*
/sigma	1.842	0.912	154.769	1.520	0.900	188.452	3.527	2.071	137.954	4.486	3.227	81.428
	(0.046)***	(0.023)***	(3.627)***	(0.022)***	(0.013)***	(2.520)***	(0.039)***	(0.023)***	(1.463)***	(0.083)***	(0.060)***	(1.481)***
/sigma_/mu	2.416	1.198	170.232	1.586	0.927	155.528	2.076	1.107	66.876	3.181	2.187	50.717
	(0.109)	(0.060)***	(11.470)***	(0.052)***	(0.029)***	(5.512)***	(0.064)***	(0.035)***	(2.229)***	(0.129)***	(0.091)***	(2.250)***
Observations	24150	24135	24135	24150	24135	24135	24150	24135	24135	24150	24135	24135
loglike	-3647.000	-2969.000	-7874.000	-9786.000	-8314.000	-23649.000	-18220.000	-15642.000	-35405.000	-8144.000	-7576.000	-12941.000
LR Test	85.420***	129.430***	143.840***	72.350***	114.530***	133.980***	52.630***	47.240***	57.400***	29.900***	35.500***	39.940***

Table 8. Estimation results for campaign contributions by cotton farmers to various forms of PACs.The subsidy receipt and acres harvested variables are in per capita terms in the per donor and per capita models. *,,*** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.**

Variable	Cotton PAC	Cotton Per Donor	Cotton Per Capita	Ag. PAC	Ag. PAC Per Donor	Ag. PAC Per Capita	RNC	RNC Per Donor	RNC Per Capita	DNC	DNC Per Donor	DNC Per Capita
Constant	-1.748	1.064	33.166	-1.756	-0.433	-37.815	-2.452	-2.404	-309.407	5.283	2.584	21.820
	(3.119)	(0.792)	(205.831)	(8.242)	(1.659)	(148.622)	(6.526)	(3.170)	(255.574)	(6.664)	(4.377)	(54.294)
Cotton Yield	0.921	0.271	52.955	2.268	0.369	42.804	0.930	0.337	31.835	-0.740	-0.384	-4.809
	(0.312)***	(0.069)***	(13.154)***	(0.512)***	(0.087)***	(10.240)***	(0.598)	(0.300)	(28.961)	(0.585)	(0.406)	(4.879)
Cotton Revenue	7.457	10.801	-2872.296	-3.174	6.505	-1619.842	-7.773	-148.006	-9128.420	1.435	-1298.445	-16727.000
	(1.900)***	(14.122)	(3297.448)	(3.302)	(20.131)	(2551.555)	(3.707)**	(129.599)	(2.295)***	(3.208)	(484.618)***	(5822.335)***
Cotton Price	0.465	0.158	8.853	2.508	0.484	35.176	4.651	2.126	170.996	3.274	2.701	35.736
	(0.409)	(0.089)*	(17.056)	(0.666)***	(0.111)***	(13.118)***	(0.767)***	(0.381)***	(36.546)***	(0.751)***	(0.537)***	(6.456)***
Cotton Subsidy	0.022	0.019	32.820	0.002	0.997	127.505	-0.002	-0.197	19.166	0.022	7.921	94.706
	(0.015)	(0.407)	(78.823)	(0.026)	(0.511)*	(60.520)**	(0.030)	(1.997)	(176.564)	(0.028)	(3.251)**	(39.123)**
Num. Farmers	0.760	0.206	31.494	1.707	0.333	11.575	2.563	1.161	97.460	1.811	1.099	8.823
	(0.467)	(0.098)**	(18.953)*	(0.787)**	(0.128)***	(15.015)	(0.914)***	(0.453)**	(43.908)**	(0.718)**	(0.481)**	(5.775)
Average Cotton Yield	-0.665	0.265	34.868	-0.312	0.475	27.236	-0.970	0.181	4.514	-0.728	-0.123	-2.179
	(0.828)	(0.224)	(44.600)	(1.508)	(0.393)	(31.786)	(1.376)	(0.701)	(58.665)	(1.322)	(0.904)	(11.197)
Avg. Cotton Revenue	-7.534	0.007	9.671	15.298	-0.097	0.305	-10.370	-0.025	6.088	-5.827	-0.064	-1.064
	(4.260)*	(0.030)	(7.706)	(10.861)	(0.080)	(5.880)	(9.246)	(0.142)	(10.649)	(8.311)	(0.228)	(2.840)
Avg. Cotton Price	-4.693	-3.293	-398.490	-10.744	-2.251	-235.626	-7.610	-2.139	-83.189	-17.716	-11.528	-128.203
	(4.007)	(1.074)***	(264.077)	(10.733)	(2.183)	(190.560)	(8.429)	(4.106)	(331.283)	(8.713)**	(5.709)**	(70.692)*
Avg. Cotton Subsidy	0.261	2.735	427.984	0.353	3.602	236.613	0.226	-0.050	-40.425	0.002	-4.601	-39.009
	(0.032)***	(0.840)***	(195.525)**	(0.086)***	(1.551)**	(159.813)	(0.077)***	(3.809)	(316.741)	(0.077)	(5.528)	(67.307)
Avg. Num. Farmers	0.863	1.005	152.791	-0.856	1.241	111.792	3.687	2.077	148.423	4.468	2.614	30.697
	(0.796)	(0.156)***	(32.886)***	(1.666)	(0.215)***	(26.479)***	(1.575)**	(0.647)***	(57.884)**	(1.325)***	(0.726)***	(8.877)***
2008 Regime	0.083	-0.074	-1.632	0.793	0.156	18.412	-0.958	-0.388	-27.214	0.083	0.027	0.611
	(0.155)	(0.034)**	(6.575)	(0.249)***	(0.042)***	(5.017)***	(0.269)	(0.135)***	(13.113)**	(0.264)	(0.178)	(2.151)
2014 Regime	0.100	-0.032	18.202	-0.588	-0.048	19.216	-5.197	-2.472	-200.246	-1.073	-0.673	-7.118
	(0.221)	(0.049)	(9.312)*	(0.367)	(0.063)	(7.227)***	(0.563)***	(0.281)***	(26.486)***	(0.455)**	(0.314)**	(3.714)*
2002 Vote	-1.436	-0.287	-51.211	-1.573	-0.237	-34.481	-0.301	0.006	-1.602	-0.433	-0.247	-1.869
	(0.310)***	(0.067)***	(12.949)***	(0.498)***	(0.084)***	(10.090)***	(0.467)	(0.238)	(23.231)	(0.521)	(0.361)	(4.345)
2008 Vote	-0.476	-0.024	-15.183	-1.125	-0.137	-22.676	1.510	0.666	48.513	0.129	0.159	2.788
	(0.254)*	(0.056)	(10.704)	(0.408)***	(0.070)**	(8.305)***	(0.398)***	(0.205)***	(19.972)**	(0.400)	(0.277)	(3.301)
2014 Vote	-1.809	-0.338	-83.816	-1.228	-0.154	-47.507	-2.048	-0.821	-83.481	-0.229	0.010	-1.628
	(0.347)***	(0.074)***	(14.469)***	(0.524)**	(0.088)*	(10.437)***	(0.849)*	(0.424)	(40.781)**	(0.607)	(0.422)	(5.059)
Election Year	0.374	0.045	23.478	0.275	-0.003	12.870	1.525	0.653	57.667	0.639	0.281	3.494
	(0.135)***	(0.030)	(5.680)***	(0.216)	(0.037)	(4.359)***	(0.250)***	(0.126)***	(12.264)***	(0.240)***	(0.163)*	(1.951)*
Plains	-1.338	-0.529	-63.384	-0.754	-0.080	-16.530	-0.741	-0.407	-20.074	-1.052	-0.364	-3.012
	(0.756)*	(0.212)**	(50.465)	(1.722)	(0.373)	(34.702)	(1.432)	(0.718)	(58.095)	(1.430)	(0.970)	(12.080)
Midwest	-1.216	-0.535	-71.604	-3.024	-0.373	-47.353	-3.210	-1.955	-147.751	-1.400	-0.433	-3.871
	(0.884)	(0.228)**	(62.765)	(2.212)	(0.382)	(45.034)	(2.001)	(0.959)**	(77.839)*	(1.818)	(1.181)	(14.819)***
South	-1.000	-0.386	-54.878	-0.956	-0.164	-25.962	-1.459	-0.856	-73.140	-1.183	-0.473	-5.216
	(0.564)*	(0.159)**	(37.351)	(1.333)	(0.274)	(26.544)	(1.097)	(0.546)	(44.206)*	(1.110)	(0.753)	(9.378)
Atlantic	0.718	-0.093	-5.077	0.554	0.076	1.891	-2.198	-1.250	-106.136	-0.950	-0.343	-3.832
	(0.655)	(0.181)	(42.647)	(1.513)	(0.301)	(30.257)	(1.266)*	(0.624)**	(50.653)**	(1.244)	(0.833)	(10.384)
/sigma	2.258	0.510	96.416	4.160	0.733	85.632	4.406	2.289	222.660	2.840	1.991	23.608
	(0.056)***	(0.013)***	(2.330)***	(0.086)***	(0.016)***	(1.769)***	(0.105)***	(0.055)***	(5.102)***	(0.127)***	(0.088)***	(1.028)***
/sigma_/mu	2.651	0.598	89.783	3.032	0.626	60.391	2.389	1.151	81.546	1.917	1.219	15.607
	(0.141)***	(0.035)***	(6.354)***	(0.200)***	(0.040)***	(4.086)***	(0.153)***	(0.084)***	(7.908)***	(0.189)***	(0.131)***	(1.574)***
Observations	4515	4515	4515	4515	4515	4515	4515	4515	4515	4515	4515	4515
loglike	-2929.000	-1648.000	-6338.000	-4625.000	-2581.000	-8497.000	-3941.000	-3288.000	-7821.000	-1345.000	-1222.000	-2003.000
LR Test	37.850***	34.680***	21.760***	65.420***	33.290***	21.780***	26.790***	10.970**	6.850	19.670***	18.320***	16.480***

Table 9. Estimation results for campaign contributions by peanut farmers to various forms of PACs.The subsidy receipt and acres harvested variables are in per capita terms in the per donor and per capita models. *,,*** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.**

Variable	Peanut PAC	Peanut Per Donor	Peanut Per Capita	Ag. PAC	Ag. PAC Per Donor	Ag. PAC Per Capita	RNC	RNC Per Donor	RNC Per Capita	DNC	DNC Per Donor	DNC Per Capita
Constant	8.077	-0.289	-0.245	-6.798	-2.549	-1343.212	-4204.199	-3.467	-111.933	6904.991	2.376	4.050
	(8.506)	(2.185)	(783.172)	(8.463)	(2.011)	(985.851)	(4031.189)	(5.144)	(256.273)	(3808.272)*	(6.820)	(278.479)
Peanut Yield	0.422	0.210	54.881	0.521	0.163	53.999	904.307	0.142	-3.724	775.493	0.320	16.309
	(0.272)	(0.055)***	(22.235)**	(0.238)**	(0.044)***	(25.557)**	(659.790)	(0.170)	(8.034)	(517.647)	(0.324)	(13.963)
Peanut Revenue	0.081	-0.006	1.237	0.004	0.003	1.936	-115.395	0.016	-0.178	-91.315	-0.384	-15.715
	(0.028)***	(0.012)	(4.678)	(0.026)	(0.011)	(5.951)	(73.032)	(0.064)	(2.936)	(58.335)	(0.360)	(15.322)
Peanut Price	9.257	3.216	2108.399	13.297	2.559	2629.824	14394.000	3.946	445.916	4210.917	2.722	124.535
	(3.511)***	(0.858)***	(347.434)***	(3.192)***	(0.683)***	(403.758)***	(8228.673)*	(2.338)*	(111.936)***	(6621.006)	(4.257)	(185.771)
Peanut Subsidy	-0.132	0.010	-105.560	-0.126	-0.011	-201.597	-21.092	-0.832	-73.865	49.029	2.717	104.365
	(0.043)***	(0.249)	(96.479)	(0.037)***	(0.217)	(119.424)*	(72.179)	(1.385)	(66.404)	(53.190)	(2.748)	(117.342)
Num. Farmers	3.030	0.395	79.087	2.181	0.302	-66.336	8155.911	2.077	60.253	2370.230	1.571	62.265
	(1.308)**	(0.247)	(94.958)	(1.040)**	(0.187)	(100.648)	(2121.893)***	(0.575)***	(27.685)**	(1540.368)	(0.994)	(42.311)
Average Peanut Yield	-1.136	-0.072	-10.580	-0.463	0.070	27.667	-4371.111	-0.818	-35.295	-3943.039	-2.072	-89.348
	(0.703)	(0.157)	(56.631)	(0.708)	(0.147)	(71.163)	(1294.062)***	(0.391)**	(19.560)*	(1329.860)***	(0.852)**	(35.274)**
Avg. Peanut Revenue	-0.050	-0.113	-49.554	0.100	0.054	19.380	328.690	-0.013	0.404	160.729	-0.059	-6.505
	(0.069)	(0.103)	(37.436)	(0.068)	(0.078)	(37.779)	(128.433)**	(0.229)	(11.318)	(92.119)*	(0.430)	(17.912)
Avg. Peanut Price	-45.417	-7.458	-4258.204	-3.117	0.798	-760.861	2698.151	6.040	-162.292	-4969.686	1.614	394.282
	(30.109)	(7.818)	(2816.863)	(29.480)	(7.134)	(3497.523)	(1082.761)**	(18.194)	(908.777)	(1055.979)***	(23.332)	(952.551)
Avg. Peanut Subsidy	0.703	3.153	1763.144	0.253	0.284	1070.411	-307.327	2.539	353.564	-82.576	0.323	92.034
	(0.247)***	(1.758)*	(631.779)***	(0.248)	(1.558)	(739.255)	(329.848)	(4.237)	(203.408)*	(312.694)	(7.960)	(325.080)
Avg. Num. Farmers	-6.352	3.565	1477.746	10.424	4.912	2461.501	22725.000	8.549	388.984	-2440.498	0.385	13.784
	(6.741)	(0.982)***	(360.030)***	(6.796)	(0.862)***	(444.117)***	(941.862)***	(2.289)***	(114.017)***	(7851.658)	(3.550)	(145.876)
2008 Regime	1.562	0.376	141.337	1.682	0.431	197.761	469.080	0.139	21.606	-410.507	-0.167	-7.681
	(0.416)***	(0.090)***	(36.459)***	(0.355)***	(0.069)***	(40.159)***	(864.487)	(0.231)	(11.197)*	(770.020)	(0.473)	(20.287)
2014 Regime	1.210	0.420	151.161	1.246	0.333	158.467	-6285.442	-1.901	-72.695	-7636.222	-7.420	-256.678
	(0.527)**	(0.114)***	(45.664)***	(0.462)***	(0.095)***	(53.514)***	(2026.227)***	(0.624)***	(29.901)**	(21.261)***	(480.635)	(3523.647)
2002 Vote	-2.690	-0.312	-153.105	-2.397	-0.244	-164.470	641.566	0.244	-18.552	27.595	0.026	-6.730
	(1.015)***	(0.175)*	(68.270)**	(0.835)***	(0.139)*	(78.086)**	(1519.959)	(0.390)	(19.339)	(1166.863)	(0.741)	(31.741)
2008 Vote	-3.490	-0.639	-243.385	-3.099	-0.605	-293.892	-1821.980	-0.539	-34.647	1109.503	0.412	19.228
	(0.917)***	(0.186)***	(75.248)***	(0.683)***	(0.136)***	(76.799)***	(1423.523)	(0.409)	(19.176)*	(974.466)	(0.678)	(28.424)
2014 Vote	-3.667	-0.917	-1128.786	-4.438	-0.922	-590.058	-14567.000	-7.007	-271.013	-737.194	-0.527	-31.062
	(0.911)***	(0.196)***	(5144.325)	(0.813)***	(0.163)***	(120.230)***	(23.007)***	(476.214)	(3130.635)	(10.366)***	(912.738)	(6965.074)
Election Year	0.348	-0.004	-5.590	0.169	0.008	6.143	1931.214	0.597	39.536	612.345	0.333	17.336
	(0.288)	(0.064)	(24.835)	(0.254)	(0.054)	(29.395)	(711.345)***	(0.206)***	(9.836)***	(606.804)	(0.410)	(17.253)
South	-3.233	-0.466	-202.294	-1.848	-0.168	-77.058	-984.534	-0.270	-25.087	-3557.109	-2.251	-80.884
	(1.402)**	(0.368)	(131.422)	(1.445)	(0.346)	(170.345)	(1526.523)	(0.881)	(43.765)	(1044.687)***	(1.193)*	(48.949)*
Atlantic	-2.720	-1.066	-439.921	-1.931	-0.604	-276.865	-2522.473	-1.367	-61.700	-1012.888	-1.239	-51.615
	(1.252)**	(0.261)***	(95.656)***	(1.282)	(0.239)**	(115.732)**	(1940.173)	(0.584)**	(29.080)**	(1179.504)	(0.748)*	(30.350)*
/sigma	2.696	0.603	221.321	2.747	0.591	304.912	5776.725	1.694	80.166	2429.598	1.709	72.405
	(0.135)***	(0.033)***	(11.597)***	(0.111)***	(0.026)***	(12.582)***	(331.253)***	(0.102)***	(4.840)***	(410.561)***	(0.285)***	(11.856)***
/sigma_/mu	1.470	0.414	137.552	1.679	0.413	186.120	2166.824	0.768	40.438	924.533	0.653	24.261
	(0.230)***	(0.058)***	(21.611)***	(0.217)***	(0.050)***	(25.737)***	(507.392)***	(0.152)***	(7.409)***	(426.077)**	(0.300)**	(13.004)*
Observations	1305	1305	1305	1305	1305	1305	1305	1305	1305	1305	1305	1305
loglike	-737.323	-448.157	-1611.000	-1076.000	-612.889	-2517.000	-1840.000	-519.756	-1155.000	-312.451	-118.067	-218.484
LR Test	26.880***	3.250	36.420***	41.110***	31.990***	39.930***	55.300***	25.890***	66.200***	20.430***	14.770**	14.370**

Table 10. Estimation results for campaign contributions by rice farmers to various forms of PACs.The subsidy receipt and acres harvested variables are in per capita terms in the per donor and per capita models. *,,*** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.**

Variable	Rice PAC	Rice Per Donor	Rice Per Capita	Ag. PAC	Ag. PAC Per Donor	Ag. PAC Per Capita	RNC	RNC Per Donor	RNC Per Capita	DNC	DNC Per Donor	DNC Per Capita
Constant	-50.352	-9.060	-9623.940	-35.600	-5.568	-5737.209	-546.100	-244.848	-2094.612	-23395.000	-21.268	-2073.282
	(12.637)***	(2.569)***	(2181.308)***	(11.678)***	(2.330)**	(1667.683)***	(73.213)***	(27.470)***	(233.866)***	(595.606)***	(7.515)***	(808.714)**
Rice Yield	0.373	0.135	46.732	0.408	0.156	53.976	3.120	1.410	11.260	259.937	0.175	11.841
	(0.135)***	(0.029)***	(37.701)	(0.122)***	(0.029)***	(34.224)	(1.711)*	(0.553)**	(4.539)**	(311.705)	(0.144)	(15.688)
Rice Revenue	0.032	0.005	32.566	0.029	0.005	32.060	-0.009	-1.149	-10.632	30.963	-0.073	-7.294
	(0.006)***	(0.004)	(5.465)***	(0.006)***	(0.004)	(5.226)***	(0.073)	(0.883)	(7.960)	(14.817)**	(0.122)	(11.684)
Rice Price	0.207	0.023	72.130	0.171	0.016	63.339	0.322	-0.013	0.087	-6.364	0.013	4.694
	(0.048)***	(0.010)**	(12.514)***	(0.045)***	(0.010)*	(11.646)***	(0.632)	(0.182)	(1.519)	(128.819)	(0.050)	(5.465)
Rice Subsidy	-0.031	0.458	107.607	-0.037	0.454	8.697	0.602	5.347	56.260	73.419	3.349	314.023
	(0.014)**	(0.231)**	(299.026)	(0.014)***	(0.233)*	(275.101)	(0.171)***	(5.237)	(44.086)	(35.394)**	(1.487)**	(152.193)**
Num. Farmers	0.170	0.012	-541.410	0.099	0.025	-564.384	3.674	0.903	4.398	1717.135	0.620	77.465
	(0.458)	(0.106)	(129.447)***	(0.434)	(0.108)	(123.047)***	(7.498)	(2.376)	(19.234)	(1088.073)	(0.501)	(53.810)
Average Rice Yield	0.951	0.208	227.540	0.924	0.190	169.562	1.065	2.125	18.480	1998.879	1.049	98.175
	(0.548)*	(0.100)**	(87.342)***	(0.514)*	(0.097)*	(73.119)**	(3.645)	(1.212)*	(10.248)*	(1002.814)**	(0.431)**	(45.390)**
Avg. Rice Revenue	0.013	-0.022	50.039	0.013	-0.020	52.392	-0.007	0.747	6.773	2.058	0.108	16.720
	(0.014)	(0.039)	(32.212)	(0.014)	(0.039)	(26.589)**	(0.136)	(0.492)	(4.220)	(33.676)	(0.125)	(13.755)
Avg. Rice Price	3.323	0.587	593.437	2.054	0.279	290.005	12.277	4.869	45.553	-574.657	0.159	21.550
	(1.032)***	(0.209)***	(176.645)***	(0.959)**	(0.189)	(135.479)**	(6.518)*	(2.441)**	(20.783)**	(476.245)	(0.663)	(71.503)
Avg. Rice Subsidy	0.100	-0.002	6.072	0.099	0.140	107.315	0.506	-3.051	-22.511	-235.486	-16.123	-1545.880
	(0.076)	(0.498)	(394.952)***	(0.084)	(0.483)	(323.476)	(0.676)	(5.648)	(47.944)	(167.514)	(5.748)***	(593.996)***
Avg. Num. Farmers	1.007	0.312	906.562	1.061	0.345	868.298	1.099	4.073	34.951	1852.195	0.186	-9.899
	(0.704)	(0.158)**	(164.723)***	(0.770)	(0.163)**	(149.746)***	(9.661)	(3.031)	(24.701)	(1601.559)	(0.674)	(72.944)
2008 Regime	-1.478	-0.243	-541.459	-0.837	-0.092	-411.462	0.847	-0.167	-0.294	812.120	0.410	30.398
	(0.344)***	(0.077)***	(102.038)***	(0.316)***	(0.077)	(93.033)***	(4.249)	(1.410)	(11.716)	(837.150)	(0.387)	(41.715)
2014 Regime	-0.247	-0.104	-61.632	-0.338	-0.179	-81.947	-21.252	-8.070	-68.413	-923.669	-0.556	-34.761
	(0.387)	(0.085)	(108.458)	(0.362)	(0.086)**	(101.007)	(6.892)***	(2.340)***	(19.280)***	(1135.903)	(0.546)	(56.754)
2002 Vote	-0.311	-0.264	-59.993	-0.453	-0.346	-87.925	2.115	1.598	8.180	-2663.208	-1.159	-95.671
	(0.480)	(0.109)**	(144.197)	(0.448)	(0.110)***	(134.078)	(4.926)	(1.687)	(14.109)	(1380.589)**	(0.602)*	(64.557)
2008 Vote	0.036	0.129	120.060	-0.540	0.011	1.392	3.521	0.458	6.563	-656.002	-0.398	-41.270
	(0.403)	(0.092)	(119.299)	(0.375)	(0.092)	(110.280)	(4.571)	(1.524)	(12.603)	(979.324)	(0.457)	(48.973)
2014 Vote	-1.206	0.146	-517.887	-1.149	0.126	-504.298	-19.625	-7.099	-45.165	600.645	0.411	91.025
	(0.473)**	(0.107)	(146.297)***	(0.448)**	(0.110)	(137.721)***	(12.053)	(4.170)*	(30.775)	(1328.329)	(0.627)	(61.718)
Election Year	0.257	-0.058	-51.810	0.305	-0.007	-35.257	6.682	2.653	25.419	878.016	0.339	45.943
	(0.209)	(0.046)	(60.509)	(0.193)	(0.046)	(55.566)	(2.618)**	(0.866)***	(7.239)***	(521.189)*	(0.237)	(25.370)*
Plains	-3.684	-0.849	-725.842	-2.113	-0.396	-344.165	331.086	152.654	1260.815	7860.457	7.783	669.956
	(1.803)**	(0.395)**	(321.131)**	(1.758)	(0.367)	(261.094)	(14.240)***	(5.184)***	(44.110)***	(1443.480)***	(1.541)***	(164.621)***
West	-21.799	-4.189	-4185.667	-13.217	-2.142	-2108.344	251.599	119.681	950.474	6969.954	5.584	368.107
	(6.876)***	(1.421)***	(1203.223)***	(6.310)**	(1.294)*	(926.313)**	(49.724)***	(18.830)***	(160.343)***	(1448.922)***	(5.076)	(547.576)
South	-3.334	-0.627	-534.420	-1.988	-0.289	-237.804	329.024	152.412	1259.152	8087.949	8.872	773.251
	(1.376)**	(0.328)*	(261.507)**	(1.248)	(0.305)	(215.933)	(10.758)***	(3.906)***	(33.262)***	(877.212)***	(1.083)***	(116.251)***
/sigma	2.339	0.546	698.254	2.259	0.571	671.709	24.524	8.245	68.912	3588.875	1.676	172.581
	(0.079)***	(0.019)***	(22.232)***	(0.072)***	(0.019)***	(20.417)***	(1.052)***	(0.355)***	(3.008)***	(287.751)***	(0.141)***	(13.214)***
/sigma_/mu	2.018	0.349	214.789	2.020	0.330	150.863	6.972	3.024	26.459	1875.673	0.729	80.947
	(0.180)***	(0.042)***	(45.691)***	(0.211)***	(0.039)***	(43.121)***	(1.724)***	(0.604)***	(5.096)***	(406.830)***	(0.182)***	(18.511)***
Observations	1035	1035	1035	1035	1035	1035	1035	1035	1035	1035	1035	1035
loglike	-1392.000	-682.128	-4155.000	-1502.000	-763.252	-4558.000	-1501.000	-1202.000	-1812.000	-1087.000	-344.541	-779.938
LR Test	25.600***	16.350***	47.120***	22.210***	10.490*	43.800***	4.920	10.160*	11.400**	6.660	22.790***	19.090***

Table 11. Marginal effects of the estimations of corn farmer contributions to PACs.

Variable	Corn PAC	Corn Per Donor	Corn Avg.	Ag. PAC	Ag. PAC Per Donor	Ag. PAC Avg.	RNC	RNC Per Donor	RNC Avg.	DNC	DNC Per Donor	DNC Avg.
Corn Yield	0.494	0.241	34.598	0.971	0.694	92.960	2.606	1.469	63.404	1.326	1.003	22.092
Corn Revenue	0.000	0.026	0.892	0.063	0.029	3.685	-0.034	-0.132	0.434	0.068	0.068	-0.203
Corn Price	0.001	0.013	2.045	-0.001	0.018	3.580	-0.019	0.038	3.029	-0.014	0.029	0.781
Corn Subsidy	0.030	0.012	2.638	0.031	0.018	10.691	0.068	-0.042	13.623	0.036	0.072	6.888
Num. Farmers	-0.031	-0.025	-7.112	0.027	-0.001	-9.529	0.517	0.228	12.247	0.494	0.279	4.093
2008 Regime	0.986	0.398	58.972	0.484	0.281	45.941	-1.594	-0.772	-43.279	-0.399	-0.028	-1.906
2014 Regime	0.862	0.342	64.620	-0.245	-0.152	-25.811	-4.878	-2.522	-154.502	-3.912	-2.423	-55.247
2002 Vote	-1.148	-0.542	-70.252	-0.712	-0.411	-66.582	-0.690	-0.358	-18.227	-1.853	-1.194	-30.645
2008 Vote	-0.552	-0.252	-57.100	-0.590	-0.279	-68.081	0.909	0.512	26.387	-0.013	0.107	0.956
2014 Vote	-0.378	-0.085	-44.370	-0.346	-0.183	-45.560	-3.686	-2.155	-136.418	-2.563	-1.883	-34.761
Election Year	0.151	0.029	15.669	0.159	0.063	19.301	1.759	0.860	57.521	1.989	1.225	31.771
Plains	-1.756	-0.701	-90.818	-0.043	0.185	28.670	0.586	0.229	18.524	1.514	1.022	27.616
Midwest	-0.719	-0.165	-28.002	-0.220	0.043	5.706	-0.105	-0.082	-4.214	0.225	0.288	7.036
South	-3.824	-1.438	-240.829	0.174	0.245	38.300	0.384	0.142	15.240	-0.329	-0.023	1.035
Atlantic	-2.999	-1.017	-171.857	-0.948	-0.393	-63.927	-0.405	-0.166	-13.678	0.490	0.574	13.456

Table 12. Marginal effects of the estimations of cotton farmer contributions to PACs.

Variable	Cotton PAC	Cotton Per Donor	Cotton Avg.	Ag. PAC	Ag. PAC Per Donor	Ag. PAC Avg.	RNC	RNC Per Donor	RNC Avg.	DNC	DNC Per Donor	DNC Avg.
Cotton Yield	0.216	0.068	11.314	0.629	0.116	11.352	0.222	0.079	6.521	-0.090	-0.045	-0.561
Cotton Revenue	1.746	2.694	-613.690	-0.880	2.036	-429.585	-1.856	-34.791	-1869.769	0.174	-150.954	-1950.387
Cotton Price	0.005	0.040	1.892	0.001	0.152	9.329	0.000	0.500	35.025	0.003	0.314	4.167
Cotton Subsidy	0.109	0.005	7.012	0.695	0.312	33.814	1.111	-0.046	3.926	0.398	0.921	11.043
Num. Farmers	0.178	0.051	6.729	0.473	0.104	3.070	0.612	0.273	19.963	0.220	0.128	1.029
2008 Regime	0.083	-0.074	-1.632	0.793	0.156	18.412	-0.958	-0.388	-27.214	0.083	0.027	0.611
2014 Regime	0.100	-0.032	18.202	-0.588	-0.048	19.216	-5.197	-2.472	-200.246	-1.073	-0.673	-7.118
2002 Vote	-1.436	-0.287	-51.211	-1.573	-0.237	-34.481	-0.301	0.006	-1.602	-0.433	-0.247	-1.869
2008 Vote	-0.476	-0.024	-15.183	-1.125	-0.137	-22.676	1.510	0.666	48.513	0.129	0.159	2.788
2014 Vote	-1.809	-0.338	-83.816	-1.228	-0.154	-47.507	-2.048	-0.821	-83.481	-0.229	0.010	-1.628
Election Year	0.374	0.045	23.478	0.275	-0.003	12.870	1.525	0.653	57.667	0.639	0.281	3.494
Plains	-1.338	-0.529	-63.384	-0.754	-0.080	-16.530	-0.741	-0.407	-20.074	-1.052	-0.364	-3.012
Midwest	-1.216	-0.535	-71.604	-3.024	-0.373	-47.353	-3.210	-1.955	-147.751	-1.400	-0.433	-3.871
South	-1.000	-0.386	-54.878	-0.956	-0.164	-25.962	-1.459	-0.856	-73.140	-1.183	-0.473	-5.216
Atlantic	0.718	-0.093	-5.077	0.554	0.076	1.891	-2.198	-1.250	-106.136	-0.950	-0.343	-3.832

Table 13. Marginal effects of the estimations of peanut farmer contributions to PACs.

Variable	Peanut PAC	Peanut Per Donor	Peanut Avg.	Ag. PAC	Ag. PAC Per Donor	Ag. PAC Avg.	RNC	RNC Per Donor	RNC Avg.	DNC	DNC Per Donor	DNC Avg.
Peanut Yield	0.078	0.044	9.466	0.134	0.048	12.499	123.242	0.021	-0.564	31.283	0.013	0.627
Peanut Revenue	0.015	-0.001	0.213	0.001	0.001	0.448	-15.726	0.002	-0.027	-3.684	-0.016	-0.604
Peanut Price	-0.024	0.672	363.652	-0.032	0.755	608.699	-2.874	0.588	67.482	1.978	0.111	4.787
Peanut Subsidy	1.712	0.002	-18.207	3.417	-0.003	-46.662	1961.608	-0.124	-11.178	169.866	0.111	4.012
Num. Farmers	0.560	0.083	13.641	0.561	0.089	-15.354	1111.511	0.309	9.118	95.614	0.064	2.394
2008 Regime	1.562	0.376	141.337	1.682	0.431	197.761	469.080	0.139	21.606	-410.507	-0.167	-7.681
2014 Regime	1.210	0.420	151.161	1.246	0.333	158.467	-6285.442	-1.901	-72.695	-7636.222	-7.420	-256.678
2002 Vote	-2.690	-0.312	-153.105	-2.397	-0.244	-164.470	641.566	0.244	-18.552	27.595	0.026	-6.730
2008 Vote	-3.490	-0.639	-243.385	-3.099	-0.605	-293.892	-1821.980	-0.539	-34.647	1109.503	0.412	19.228
2014 Vote	-3.667	-0.917	-1128.786	-4.438	-0.922	-590.058	-14566.947	-7.007	-271.013	-737.194	-0.527	-31.062
Election Year	0.348	-0.004	-5.590	0.169	0.008	6.143	1931.214	0.597	39.536	612.345	0.333	17.336
South	-3.233	-0.466	-202.294	-1.848	-0.168	-77.058	-984.534	-0.270	-25.087	-3557.109	-2.251	-80.884
Atlantic	-2.720	-1.066	-439.921	-1.931	-0.604	-276.865	-2522.473	-1.367	-61.700	-1012.888	-1.239	-51.615

Table 14. Marginal effects of the estimations of rice farmer contributions to PACs.

Variable	Rice PAC	Rice Per Donor	Rice Avg.	Ag. PAC	Ag. PAC Per Donor	Ag. PAC Avg.	RNC	RNC Per Donor	RNC Avg.	DNC	DNC Per Donor	DNC Avg.
Rice Yield	0.173	0.061	15.482	0.202	0.079	19.219	0.678	0.319	2.631	35.954	0.023	1.451
Rice Revenue	0.015	0.002	10.789	0.014	0.002	11.415	-0.002	-0.260	-2.484	4.283	-0.010	-0.894
Rice Price	-0.015	0.010	23.896	-0.018	0.008	22.553	0.131	-0.003	0.020	10.155	0.002	0.575
Rice Subsidy	0.096	0.207	35.649	0.085	0.230	3.097	0.070	1.210	13.145	-0.880	0.443	38.477
Num. Farmers	0.079	0.005	-179.361	0.049	0.013	-200.960	0.799	0.204	1.028	237.511	0.082	9.492
2008 Regime	-1.478	-0.243	-541.459	-0.837	-0.092	-411.462	0.847	-0.167	-0.294	812.120	0.410	30.398
2014 Regime	-0.247	-0.104	-61.632	-0.338	-0.179	-81.947	-21.252	-8.070	-68.413	-923.669	-0.556	-34.761
2002 Vote	-0.311	-0.264	-59.993	-0.453	-0.346	-87.925	2.115	1.598	8.180	-2663.208	-1.159	-95.671
2008 Vote	0.036	0.129	120.060	-0.540	0.011	1.392	3.521	0.458	6.563	-656.002	-0.398	-41.270
2014 Vote	-1.206	0.146	-517.887	-1.149	0.126	-504.298	-19.625	-7.099	-45.165	600.645	0.411	91.025
Election Year	0.257	-0.058	-51.810	0.305	-0.007	-35.257	6.682	2.653	25.419	878.016	0.339	45.943
Plains	-3.684	-0.849	-725.842	-2.113	-0.396	-344.165	331.086	152.654	1260.815	7860.457	7.783	669.956
West	-21.799	-4.189	-4185.667	-13.217	-2.142	-2108.344	251.599	119.681	950.474	6969.954	5.584	368.107
South	-3.334	-0.627	-534.420	-1.988	-0.289	-237.804	329.024	152.412	1259.152	8087.949	8.872	773.251



Figure 1. Graph depicting the levels of contributions from corn farmers to various types of PACs.



Figure 2. Graph depicting the levels of contributions from cotton farmers to various types of PACs.



Figure 3. Graph depicting the levels of contributions from peanut farmers to various types of PACs.



Figure 4. Graph depicting the levels of contributions from rice farmers to various types of PACs.